instructed by Thomas Bräuninger
Monday 10:15 am - 11:45 am in A5 6, B 317 Seminarraum
Start date: 04-09-2017, Finish date: 04-12-2017
The objective of this course is to provide students with the basics of formal modeling in political science. The course has some breadth in coverage in the sense that it provides a graduate-level introduction and overview to different areas in game theory. It is also narrow in the sense that the emphasis is not on application and model testing but getting trained in reading and writing down formal models. At the conceptual level the course will cover the following topics: preferences and individual choices, decision theory, normal form games, Nash equilibria, extensive form games, subgame perfect equilibria, repeated games, bargaining, games with incomplete and imperfect information, Bayesian perfect equilibria, signalling games. At the substantial level, we will use these concepts to study, as examples, candidate competition, political lobbying, and war and deterrence.