HS Ausgewählte Themen der Vergleichenden Regierungslehre I: Social Choice
durchgeführt von Anna-Sophie Kurella
Montags 15:30 - 17:00 Uhr in B6, 30-32 Bauteil E-F, Seminarraum 211
Startdatum: 12.2.2018; Enddatum: 28.05.2018
How can a group of individuals arrive at the best decision? Does the choice of how to choose affect the quality of the choice itself? What is the right action after all? These are hard, but important questions for political scientists and this seminar is going to explore them. To begin with we will study the basics of social choice theory like preference profiles and aggregation rules in order to understand and discuss important results of the theory and their implications for democratic decision making. Amongst others we will discuss the Condorcet paradox, as well as the theorems of Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite. These theorems suggest that in many situations there is no 'best' decision that satisfies all group members and meets certain democratic standards. Thus we have to ask how political institutions can nevertheless legitimate their decisions. This will be the starting point for seminar discussions of democratic decision making processes and criteria of legitimacy. Concluding we will take a look at real world implementations of various decision rules (e.g. in national elections) and discuss them with reference to the theoretical concepts we developed in the first part of the seminar.